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RECENT DECISIONS
mits itself to the archaic distinction between mistake of fact and
mistake of law, a dictum unhappily indicative of slavish adherence to
precedent.8
P.F.
JURISDICTION-FEDERAL COURTS-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
-APPLIcATION OF STATE LAw.-Plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation,
sued for commissions allegedly due by reason of a sale of defendant's
real estate located in Mississippi. Suit having been brought in the
United States District Court for Mississippi on the grounds of di-
versity of citizenship, that court found the contract void under
Mississippi law since plaintiff had failed to comply with a state
statute' which required that foreign corporations doing business in
that state file a written power of attorney designating an agent on
whom service of process may be had. The United States Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the contract was not void but only
unenforceable in Mississippi state courts, and the fact that the re-
spondent could not sue in the state courts did not preclude its bring-
ing the action in the federal court sitting in that state. The Court
of Appeals relied on David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club
of America,2 in which a similar prohibition against use of the courts
of the State of New York 3 was held not to bar a non-complying
corporation from bringing its suit in the federal court. "The State
could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors in the courts of the
United States, and could not deprive of their privileges those who
were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States
to resort to the Federal courts for the enforcement of a valid con-
tract." 4 Because of the seeming conflict of that holding with the
recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Angel v.
Bullington,ri a writ of certiorari was granted. Held, judgment re-
versed. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is in
effeet only another court of the state in which it sits. The fact that
8 See Hunt v. Rousmaniere, supra note 2. For the more modern view
concerning mistake of law, see N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 112f; Ryon v. Wana-
maker, 116 Misc. 91, 190 N. Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 202 App.
Div. 848, 194 N. Y. Supp. 977 (2d Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 545, 139 N. E.
728 (1923).
' MISS. CODE ANN. § 5319 (1942), which also provides, "... any foreign
corporation failing to comply with the above provisions shall not be permitted
to bring or maintain any action or suit in any of the courts of this state."
2225 U. S. 489 (1912).
3 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 218.
4 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489,
500 (1912).
5330 U. S. 183 (1947). For an interesting discussion of this case see
Note, 21 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 184 (1947).
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the corporation could not sue in Mississippi courts closed the doors
of the federal courts sitting in that state. Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U. S. 535 (1949).
The decision in the instant case has clarified the holding in Angel
v. Bullington. It was doubtful whether the Angel case had in fact
overruled the holding in the Lupton's Sons Co. case or whether the
reference to that case had been mere dicta. The confusion existed
because Angel v. Bullington had been decided both on the ground of
res judicata and on the policy established in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,0
which precluded an action which is barred in a state court from being
brought in a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
In the Angel case the court commented, "Cases like Lupton's Sons
Co. v. Automobile Club ... are obsolete insofar as they are based
on a view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins .... ,, 7 The doubtfulness of the Angel hold-
ing was expressed by the Court of Appeals wheh it said, "We do not
consider it [Angel v. Bullington] to have overruled the David Lup-
ton's Sons Co. case upon the question with which we are now con-
cerned and with respect to which the David Lupton's Sons Co. case
expressly dealt." 8 This doubt was promptly dispelled in the prin-
cipal case by the Supreme Court when it said, "But where a decision
rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category
of obiter dictum." The court also helped to clarify the distinction
between substantive and procedural law. It relied on the test laid
down in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 9 Simply stated, this test is:
"what will be the result of the particular ruling on the outcome of
the litigation ?" If the outcome is substantially affected, the matter is
substantive. The court felt the matter here to be of substance and
said, ". . .where in such cases one is barred from recovery in the
state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal court." 10
The decision in this case represents a definite extension of the
doctrine laid down in the Erie case, followed in the York case and
in Angel v. Bullington, that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction a
federal court is in effect only another court of the state in which it
sits. Observing the spirit of the Erie case and the letter of the state
statute involved, the federal court "cannot afford recovery if the
right to recover is made unavailable by the state nor can it substan-
tially affect the enforcement of the right given by the state." In so
deciding, the intent of the Erie decision was followed. This intent
was to assure the non-resident litigant of a court free from suscep-
6 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
7330 U. S. 183, 192 (1947).
8 Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 170 F. 2d 694, 695 (C. A. 5th 1948).
9 326 U. S. 99 (1945). That court held that in a suit in equity in the
federal court to recover upon a state-created right, jurisdiction being based
solely upon diversity, a recovery cannot be had if a state statute of limitations
would have barred recovery had the suit been brought in a court of the state.
10337 U. S. 535, 69 Sup. Ct. 1235, 1237 (1949).
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tibility to potential local bias, and not to give him another body of
law under which he might gain a greater right than in the court of
the state itself.
J. J.G.
TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DocTRINE.-Plaintiff, a boy of
seven years, brought an action for injuries sustained when he fell
from a long raised runway maintained by the defendant for the pur-
pose of unloading trucks into railroad coal cars. Plaintiff claimed
that a duty of care arose under -the attractive nuisance doctrine in
favor of children who habitually frolicked in the vicinity of the ramp.
It was established that defendant's watchman had consistently at-
tempted to prevent the plaintiff from trespassing on the ramp. Held,
directed verdict for defendant affirmed. Notwithstanding proof of
the attractiveness of the instrumentality, liability will not be imposed
unless plaintiff shows that the instrumentality possessed dangerous
qualities and that defendant negligently failed to avert the injury.
Jarvis et al. v. Howard et al., - Ky. -, 219 S. W. 2d 958 (1949).
The "attractive nuisance" doctrine applies in those cases where
a defendant maintains upon his premises a condition, instrumentality,
machine or other agency which is attractive to children of tender
years by reason of their inability to appreciate the peril thereof.' In
such cases the owner is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect children against the dangers of the attraction.
The doctrine creates a problem of reconciling two conflicting in-
terests, namely, the owner's interest in the unrestricted use of his
property 2 as opposed to society's interest in the protection of chil-
I United Zinc v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268 (1922). Mr. Justice Holmes formu-
lated the rule that one of the essentials of this definition is that the child has
been enticed to enter the land by some alluring condition which he sees while
off the land. About two-thirds of the states follow this rule in an attempt to
limit the landowner's liability. But since it is contrary to the theory of the
doctrine, i.e., the prevention of a foreseeable harm to a child, it has been re-
jected by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 339 (1934). This view has been fol-
lowed by: Arizona, Buckeye Irr. Co. v. Askren, 45 Ariz. 566, 46 P. 2d 1068
(1935); Minnesota, Gimmestad v. Rose Bros., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194
1935); South Dakota, Morris v. City of Britton. 66 S. D. 121, 279 N. W.
1 (1938) ; and either quoted or cited in support by: California, Melendez v.
City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P. 2d 971 (1937) ; Colorado, Phipps v.
Mitze, 116 Colo. 288, 180 P. 2d 233 (1947); Pennsylvania, Altenbach v.
Lehigh Valley Ry., 349 Pa. 272, 37 A. 2d 429 (1944) ; Wisco sin, Angelier v.
Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N. W. 351 (1934) ; Wyoming,
Afton Elect. Co. v. Harrison, 49 Wyo. 367, 54 P. 2d 540 (1936).
2 In New York, the only duty owed to a trespasser, whether child or adult,
is to refrain from wilful and wanton injuries. The attractive nuisance doctrine
is expressly rejected in Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E.
2d 981 (1939) ; Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry., 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
However, since a child has a right to be on a public highway, it has been held
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